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Defining the Enemy for the Post-Cold War World:  
Bill Clinton’s Foreign Policy Discourse in Somalia and Haiti 
 
JASON A. EDWARDS 
Bridgewater State College 
 
 
American presidents use images of savagery to identify and construct America’s 
adversaries, especially prior to and during some form of armed intervention.  During the 
Cold War, presidents used images of modern savagery to craft a Soviet enemy and its 
proxies.  In the post-Cold War world, Bill Clinton did not have the luxury of a monolithic 
enemy to organize American foreign policy.  He faced a threat environment that was 
more complex, transnational, and diffuse.  Within this environment, I argue Clinton used 
images of primitive and modern savagery to define America’s adversaries.  An analysis 
of Clinton’s discourse reveals that his use of both of these rhetorical forms broadened 
how presidents construct America’s enemies.  Moreover, the use of both images of 
savagery provided a rhetorical flexibility that was needed for the threat environment of 
the post-Cold War world.  This essay contributes to deeper understandings of 
presidential rhetoric in general and crisis rhetoric in particular. 
 
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union defined America’s threat environment.  The Soviets were 
the central organizing principle of American foreign policy discourse and action (Cameron, 2002; Cottam, 
1992; Hinds & Windt, 1991). To depict the Soviet enemy, American presidents described the U.S.S.R. as 
an atheistic, fanatical, satanic, menacing totalitarian state bent on world domination (Ivie, 1984).  These 
depictions cultivated an image of the Soviet Union as being the epitome of a savage, while the United 
States was the pillar of civilization that would stop the advances of communism.  By cultivating an image 
of savagery, American presidents were able to establish Soviet culpability for a variety of violent actions 
within the Cold War environment (Ivie, 1980).  
 
 When the Cold War ended, the United States lost a central foe in which to do battle as well as the 
organizing principle of its foreign policy.  Consequently, questions were raised amongst foreign policy 
makers such as: Who and what were the major threats the United States faced in the post-Cold War 
world? When and where should the United States use force? What limitations should be placed on 
American military interventions (see Ikenberry, 2001; Jentleson, 1997; MacGregor Burns & Sorensen, 
1999)? 
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Questions also arose about how presidents would adapt their foreign policy discourse to a new 
threat environment.  Kane (1991) argued that the post-Cold War world provided the opportunity for a 
“new vocabulary, not necessarily superior to the one replaced, but with important implications for the 
contemporary world” (p. 80). Part of that vocabulary would certainly contain characterizations of 
America’s enemies in the post-Cold War world.  How the characterizations of those enemies were crafted 
during the Clinton administration is the subject of this essay.  I argue that Clinton had recognized that the 
United States would be facing a far different threat environment than that of his predecessors.  To 
manage this threat environment, the president expanded the rhetorical options available for depicting a 
specific adversary.  Specifically, my analysis reveals that Clinton employed images of both imperial and 
modern savagery to characterize America’s enemies.  The cultivation of two forms of savage imagery not 
only provided the president with more rhetorical flexibility, something necessary to deal with the diverse 
and complex threat environment of the post-Cold War world, but also it simultaneously allowed the 
president to reintroduce a symbolic form to define U.S. adversaries.   
 
Scholars should take interest in Clinton’s enemy construction rhetoric for two reasons. First, 
presidential enemy construction is one of the central components of a president’s foreign policy 
vocabulary, and becomes a primary guide for understanding American foreign policy at large (Edwards, 
2006; Judis, 2004).  Yet, as Kane noted, the post-Cold War world supplied the opportunity for a different 
understanding of how this component would be used by American presidents, but it has received little 
explanation from scholars, especially for the Clinton presidency (see Cole, 1999; Kuypers, 1997; Olson, 
2004; Stuckey, 1995). Understanding how Clinton crafted the depiction of America’s adversaries provides 
the opportunity to examine how U.S. presidents attempt to manage a diverse group of threats and 
responses to those threats.  It can lay the groundwork for a larger understanding of justifications for the 
use of force in a post-Cold War environment.   
 
Second, the end of the Cold War brought with it a substantially different threat environment.  
Within this context, the Clinton administration reoriented and redefined U.S. foreign policy to deal with 
these threats.  In fact, one of the central legacies of the Clinton administration was his “redefinition of the 
threat environment faced by the United States after the Cold War” (McCormick, 2000, p. 76). However, 
there has been little exploration of how Clinton redefined this threat environment.  By studying Clinton’s 
discourse on the subject, we can ascertain how his rhetoric may influence future administration strategies 
to deal with diffuse and transnational threats.  Investigating the president’s rhetoric on the subject offers 
insight into how he redefined that threat environment and the potential impact it may have on future 
administrations.   
 
To explore this aspect of Clinton’s foreign policy rhetoric, this essay is comprised of three parts.  
First, I examine the literature on presidential rhetoric and enemy construction.  Second, I analyze 
Clinton’s crafting of the depiction of the enemy in two military operations: Somalia and Haiti. I focused 
solely on how the president crafted the terminology of the adversary.  I do so because the president is the 
most important political actor in foreign affairs.  What he says and does means something.  Certainly, the 
voices of other administration officials are important, but they largely make the same arguments as the 
president.  Moreover, a president’s discourse is the most crucial when it comes to understanding particular 
international situations.  The discourse they put forth sets the boundaries and the agenda for how other 
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pundits and policy makers discuss and debate a certain subject (see Bostdorff, 1994; Edwards, 2006; 
Stuckey, 1995; Zarefsky, 2004).  To that end, I conducted textual analyses of prominent speeches 
surrounding each military intervention and used the aforementioned theoretical framework as my guide in 
my examination. For the intervention into Somalia, Clinton defined the threat through the image of the 
imperial savage.  In Haiti, however, Clinton characterized the threat through an image of modern 
savagery. Finally, I end with a discussion of implications from this analysis concerning Clinton’s foreign 
policy and the future of the presidency.   
 
Defining the Enemy in Presidential Rhetoric: Constructing Images of Primitive and  
Modern Savagery 
 
The presidency is at the center of American political culture.  Robert Denton, Jr. and Gary 
Woodward (1990) succinctly describe the importance of this political agent when they assert the 
presidency is “an office, a role, a persona, constructing a position of power, myth, legend, and persuasion.  
Everything a president does or says has implications and communicates ‘something.’  Every act, word, or 
phrase becomes calculated and measured for a response” (pp. 199-200).  This is particularly true in 
foreign affairs, because on the one hand, he is constitutionally mandated to lead.  Article II of the 
Constitution titles the president as “commander in chief” of the armed forces and gives him the power to 
“appoint ambassadors” and “to make treaties,” with the advice and consent of the Senate.  On the other 
hand, the president has a number of resources at his disposal, allowing him to obtain and dispense more 
information on international affairs than any other actor.  Hence, the president is the dominant actor in 
this realm of policy. 
 
 One particular resource that U.S. presidents often use is the bully pulpit. Richard Neustadt 
(1990) rightly pointed out that one of the true powers of the modern presidency is to persuade.  
Neustadt’s notion of persuasion partly focuses on the interpersonal level — how a president uses language 
to influence individual members of Congress — but the president’s abilities to persuade rises when it uses 
mass audience appeals.  The use of public discourse has become such an important phenomenon that 
Jeffrey Tulis (1987) went so far as to argue that the presidency has been transformed into a rhetorical 
institution.  Presidents use rhetoric as a principle tool of governance to shape the public’s perceptions on 
subjects and try to win support for various principles, positions, and policies.  A president’s rhetoric has a 
power to it that no one can match in the public arena.  For Tulis, this power is “not only a form of 
communication, it is also a way of constituting the people to whom it is addressed by furnishing them with 
the very equipment they need to assess its use — the metaphors, categories, concepts of political 
discourse” (p. 203).   Presidential rhetoric provides audiences with “equipment” to understand the political 
landscape around them.   
 
This equipment for understanding the political landscape is even more important in foreign policy 
because it is through rhetoric that a president can demonstrate his leadership, shape public perceptions 
about various issues, and influence audiences about various places, issues, and situations from his 
discourse (see Beasley, 2004; Bostdorff, 1994; Campbell & Jamieson, 1990; Dorsey, 2002; Kiewe 1994; 
Stuckey, 2004). Most Americans have very little knowledge of the issues and threats that the United 
States faces in the international arena, let alone knowledge of other nation-states, organizations, or 
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groups.  The world can be a bizarre and scary place for many (Kuusisto, 1998). They count upon the 
president to offer a semblance of order to the world around us, and it is through the use of language that 
presidents convey that sense of order.  It is through rhetoric that presidents can inform the populace of 
what goes on in the international arena.  It is through presidential rhetoric where many come to 
understand the outside world.  Thus, rhetoric becomes a primary instrument for presidential foreign 
policy. 
 
Presidential speech-making on foreign policy functions in at least two important ways. Generally, 
presidential foreign policy rhetoric serves two broad functions. First, a president’s foreign policy discourse 
can shape the political reality of foreign affairs. Murray Edelman (1988) noted that language is a “key 
creator of the worlds people experience” (p. 103).  People do not experience specific events, but 
experience the language of events.  This is not to say that specific situations and contexts do not influence 
a speaker, but it is the language used to discuss various ideas and situations that create and connect 
people to various “worlds.”  In international affairs, American presidents are the most prominent speakers 
and they use language shapes the publics understanding of the world around us.  
  
The ability to create and shape political reality comes through the president’s power of definition.  
David Zarefsky (2004) argued that political realities are not “given,” but rather are constructed from a 
variety of possibilities. In foreign policy, because they have the most knowledge of foreign affairs, along 
with extraordinary political power and speak with single voice, presidents have the ability to define how 
issues, ideas, and situations are viewed.  This does not mean that when presidents define the reality of 
American international relations it will resonate with everyone.  Nevertheless, the president’s prominence 
within American politics gives him the power to shape how foreign policy is viewed and understood.  
 
A second function of presidential foreign policy rhetoric is that it is didactic.  Edwin Hargrove 
(1998) argued the first task of presidential leadership is to:  
 
teach reality to publics and their fellow politicians through rhetoric . . . Teaching reality 
involves the explanations of contemporary problems and issues, but at its best, must 
invoke and interpret the perennial ideals of the American national experience as 
expressed in the past and the present, and as guides for our future. (pp. vii-viii) 
 
Teaching reality to the American public involves telling it stories about distant countries, little known 
cultures, and abstract values (Kuusisto, 1998).  A president’s discourse on foreign policy imparts a reality 
that outlines a symbolic universe of allies and adversaries.   In this universe, the United States is the 
defender of civilization through the promotion and protection of its values.  A violation of this order by an 
adversary — an attack against the United States, one of its allies, or against innocents — threatens that 
order. Once a president declares that such a danger exists then it becomes universal — a threat against 
civilization itself — and needs to be countered, possibly with military intervention (Bates, 2004; Butler, 
2002; Ivie, 1980, 1982; Procter, 1987).  To fully demonstrate how this enemy violated America’s foreign 
policy order, presidents shape the “other” through articulating images of savagery in defining a particular 
enemy (Lebow, 2000). 
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Through extensive study, rhetorical scholars have determined that presidents have used two 
forms of savage imagery to depict America’s enemies: the primitive or imperial savage and the modern 
savage. The former is characterized as “a primitive society, an image of a decentralized enemy, a culture 
rather than an evil individual or government” (Butler, 2002, p. 18).  The imperial savage consists of a 
particular people or culture instead of a central government or leader.  The enemy agent in question is 
primitive because there are no real discernible signs of civilization (i.e., no functioning government 
institutions or structure).  
 
Using images of primitive savagery has a long history within the United States, primarily in 
portrayals of Native Americans.  Political leaders, the media, and popular culture have depicted Native 
Americans as being “emblematic of chaos” who were “living without government,” leading lives that were 
freed from the “restraints of family, church, and village,” but engaged in acts of “incest, cannibalism, devil 
worship, and murder” (Rogin, 1987, p. 45).  According to this argument, Native Americans were devoid of 
any semblance of civilization.  Consequently, native peoples needed to be “civilized,” which entailed 
various paternal relationships in which the U.S. government declared the tribes as “wards” while the 
government was their “guardian.”  According to the government, these relationships could help move 
Native Americans from the habits of barbarism to the habits of civilization (Rogin, 1987).  The implication 
of this discourse was that it supplied ample justification for the government’s forced removal of indigenous 
peoples, along with the rape, torture, and murder of tens of thousands.   
 
Eventually, America’s leaders started using images of primitive savagery to shape the enemies 
we face in foreign policy (see Bass & Cherwitz, 1978; Coles, 2002; Merk, 1963; Stephenson, 1995; 
Winkler, 2002).  For example, President McKinley and his supporters used this image of savagery to justify 
America’s conquest of the Philippines.  John Butler explained that American politicians depicted the 
Filipinos as a barbarous, primitive race that could not understand the advantages of civilization.  They 
were “primitive savages caught within a pre-modern condition, aimlessly moving in no practical direction” 
(Butler, 2002, p. 19).  Because of their inability to understand civilization, Filipinos had no opportunity to 
evolve.  Therefore, they required the help of the United States, just as Native Americans did, to put them 
on the path to an evolved order.  However, this form of savage imagery was largely unused by American 
presidents in foreign policy during the 20th century.  Instead, presidents manufactured enemies through 
the image of a modern savage. 
 
A modern savage is represented as a particular leader or a government perpetrating acts of 
aggression against the civilized order, which includes deeds against the United States, one of its allies, or 
the savage agent’s own population.  In the vast majority of military interventions, the president defines 
the enemy as modern (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990; Ivie, 1974, 1980, 1982, 1987). This enemy is 
“modern” because it is a “centralized evil agent selfishly pursuing his or her goals without a regard for the 
nation’s people” (Butler, 2002, p. 13).  This evil agent has a “level of cultural sophistication that is 
threatening to western culture” (Butler, 2002, p. 14). In other words, the modern savage has some 
semblance of civilization that is visible through its working governmental structure anchored by 
institutions.  However, this agent is savage because it is bent on subjugating its foes by force of arms.  
The discourse used to depict this enemy dehumanizes him, making the agent appear irrational and evil.  If 
International Journal of Communication 2 (2008)  Defining the Enemy in the Post-Cold War World  835 
the enemy is irrational, then it has the propensity for unchecked aggression against America’s civilized 
order. Therefore, it must be defeated. 
 
Now to create these images of savagery, rhetors employ various topoi or specific lines of 
argument, which Robert Ivie referred to as “decivilizing vehicles.”  These vehicles are rhetorical conduits 
that describe the enemy itself and/or the particular acts of the savage (Ivie, 2004). These topoi are used 
to articulate “the key contrastive features distinguishing civilized from savage agents while synthesizing 
several dimensions of meaning into an integrated threat” (Ivie, 2004, p. 79). In other words, decivilizing 
vehicles shape the savage agent as a negative force while implying the United States as a force for good.   
 
There are two contrastive features a rhetor may utilize to demonize the enemy.  First, rhetors 
may use derogatory terms such as referring to an adversarial agent as a “terrorist,” a “murderer,” a 
“barbarian,” a “thug,” a “dictator,” and/or a litany of other names.  Second, the president may accuse the 
agent(s) and their forces of specific acts of aggression such as arson, forced migration, rape, or murder.  
By delineating these actions,   his rhetoric demonstrated the true savage nature of the enemy with the 
implication being that no civilized agent, especially the United States, would commit the wanton rape, 
torture, and murder against anyone, let alone innocents.  Thus, people who commit such acts must be 
savages. 
 
Cultivating an image of the enemy serves three functions.  First, the use of decivilizing vehicles 
literalizes the enemy.  The enemy, who has been constructed as savage, actually appears as a savage in 
the minds of the audience (Bates, 2004; Ivie, 2004).  Second, the use of those decivilizing vehicles strips 
away any qualities of civilization attributable to the agent, making it untenable for audiences to identity 
with that enemy.  When the adversary is rhetorically contrasted with the United States, this description 
gives the appearance of American superiority.  Finally, cultivating an image of the “other” helps the 
president rally public support for his decision to intervene through forces of arms (Bates, 2004; Edelman, 
1988). Constructing an enemy provides a focal point for the public to direct their anger.  A specific enemy, 
typically, supplies the motive for America’s use of force. 
 
Defining the Enemy in Somalia and Haiti  
  
 From the moment Clinton entered office, he spoke of a new threat environment.  In this new era, 
threats to the United States would be composed of “ancient hatreds and new plagues” that involved 
“bloody ethnic, religious, and civil wars . . . weapons of mass destruction . . . hunger and disease . . . 
malignant neglect of the global environment . . . and terrorism” (1993a, p. 1).  The problems that Clinton 
confronted were transnational, complex, diverse, and diffuse; making the international environment he 
faced just as dangerous the Cold War.  In this complicated atmosphere, there were specific circumstances 
when Clinton resorted to military intervention.  These situations gave the president the opportunity “to 
characterize the circumstances compelling action” (Campbell & Jamieson, 1990, p. 107).  
 
In the next two sections, I outline how Clinton crafted the depiction of America’s adversaries in 
Somalia and Haiti.  I focus on the words and phrases Clinton used to characterize America’s foe.  When 
taken together, these words and phrases paint a picture of a primitive and modern savage. 
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Constructing the Primitive Savage: Somalia 
 
Clinton inherited the Somalia situation from the previous Bush administration. The Somalia crisis 
began in 1988 as the civilian government under Siad Barre, Somalia’s leader since 1969, was overthrown 
in a coup.  Barre’s overthrow left a power vacuum that soon resulted in civil war and a humanitarian crisis 
(Besteman, 1992; Butler, 2002).  By the fall of 1992, almost a half a million Somalis had died from armed 
conflict or starvation.  The United Nations had attempted a relief mission for Somalia, but it could not 
complete its mission because of the ongoing violence within the country.  The inability to fulfill its 
humanitarian mission led the UN Security Council, with the support of the United States, to order a new 
UN humanitarian mission where the United States would provide the lead in creating security for the 
country (Hirsh & Oakley, 1996).  In December of 1992, President George H.W. Bush assigned 25,000 
military personnel to help carry out the relief mission.   
 
At first, the operation appeared to progress well in Somalia.  So well, that when Clinton 
welcomed American troops home in May of 1993, he declared the Somalia intervention as a “mission 
accomplished” (1993b, p. 565).  However, from June to October 1993, American and UN forces came 
under ferocious attacks by Somalis, for the most part under the direction of Somali General Mohammed 
Aideed.  The largest attack on American forces came on October 4, 1993, causing the death of 18 Army 
rangers, injuries to scores more, and capture of Army helicopter pilot, Michael Durant.  Americans were 
stunned by the images of American soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu and pressure 
mounted upon the administration to withdraw American ground forces.  On October 7, 1993, Clinton 
announced a plan to temporarily continue the Somalia operation to stabilize the country, but indicated the 
United States would remove its forces by the end of March 1994 (Dauber, 2001).   
 
Throughout the conflict in Somalia, Clinton defined America’s adversary as a primitive savage in 
two ways.  First, his enemy construction was made through vague labels and amorphous terms.  For 
example, he characterized the Somalia belligerents as “warlords,” (1993b, p. 566; 1993c, p. 840) “armed 
gangs,” (1993c, p. 840) a “small minority of Somalis” (1993c, p. 840) and “the people who caused much 
of this problem” (1993d, p. 1703). From this rhetoric, three items should be noted.  Initially, using these 
terms invited the audience to see that no visible sign of civilization could be found in Somali society and 
among the “people who caused much of this problem.” Rather, ambiguous and amorphous terms such as 
warlords, armed gangs, and merely a people projected an image of a nation engulfed in lawlessness and 
chaos.  The term “warlord” evokes memories of those who dominated the feudal ages of Europe, Russia, 
Japan, and China, not leaders of a nation-state at the end of the 20th century.  Calling those who caused 
this chaos “warlords” and “armed gangs” further implied there was no governmental authority to stop 
these belligerents.  The president implicitly defined Somalia as a premodern civilization unable to rein in 
the belligerents and achieve self-rule without help from the United States and the international 
community.  Moreover, as chaos reigned supreme within Somalia, the problems emanating from this 
African nation were a microcosm of the larger threats the United States faced in the post-Cold War world.  
By Clinton defining Somalis as primitive savages, he gave the impression the African nation could not 
survive without international intervention; without some semblance of “civilized” intervention the 
underlying implication was that Somali society would further devolve into anarchy.  
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Another item to note is that Clinton’s enemy construction was qualitatively different than that of 
his Cold War predecessors.  During the Cold War, presidents focused their rhetorical attention upon a 
central enemy agent, typically the Soviet Union, which became the focal point of American action. While 
Clinton did not blame one specific agent for Somalia’s problems, his depiction of the Somali enemy was 
similar to the Filipino antecedent at the turn of the 20th century.  At that time, American rhetors depicted 
Filipinos as a barbarous race incapable of maintaining a democratic form of government.  Americans in the 
Philippines battled an insurgency that had no centralized authority.  According to Senator Albert Beveridge 
and President McKinley, the Philippines were a premodern civilization in which Filipinos were not “fit” to 
govern themselves. Hence, they needed the assistance of the United States to aid in their evolution 
(Butler, 2002; Drinnon, 1980). Clinton reintroduced this enemy depiction into the presidential lexicon.  
The president argued that the enemy in Somalia was not a centralized agent, but an entire premodern 
civilization. By implication, the Somalis needed American assistance to help them become civilized.  
Furthermore, reintroducing this imperial antecedent into presidential foreign policy discourse broadened 
the rhetorical options Clinton and his successors had available to define adversaries in the post-Cold War 
world.  
 
Finally, Clinton’s vague language made it more difficult for the public to directly pinpoint who was 
responsible for the daily threats to American and UN soldiers, rhetorically undercutting the ability to rally 
public support for an intervention.  It is much easier to envision rallying support to deal with a centralized 
enemy than an amorphous one.  Cherwitz and Zagacki (1986) noted in their study of presidential crisis 
rhetoric, “whether or not presidents take military action, the very act of discoursing allows rekindling of 
ideological fervor and use of this fervor to rally public opinion around a central issue” (p. 318).  A “central 
issue” of an armed intervention is stopping the enemy and its belligerency.  A centralized agent allows a 
president to focus on a clear and specific enemy that can be vanquished.  However, Clinton’s use of 
ambiguous imagery gave the public no focal point, no chance to kindle the “ideological fervor” and support 
of the vanquishing of a clearly defined enemy.  A chaotic enemy provided little to no rhetorical grounds to 
make the case for continuing the intervention, especially after the debacle on October 4.  Simply put, the 
president’s discourse made it difficult for him to gain any public support to finish the job in Somalia.   
 
Aside from the president’s ambiguous use of language to define the Somali enemy, Clinton also 
eschewed the use of de-civilizing vehicles to label the agents responsible for the killing and destruction in 
Somalia.  Rather, his description of the situation in Somalia dealt with the results of the atrocities 
committed by the “warlords.”  For example, Clinton stated that these “warlords” created a chaotic scene 
where “over 350,000 Somalis already had died in a bloody civil war, shrouding the nation in famine and 
disease” (1993c, p. 840). These agents of evil created a civil war that brought an “agonizing death of 
starvation, a starvation brought on not only by drought, but also by the anarchy that then prevailed in 
that country” (1993d, p. 1704). The armed gangs were “determined to provoke terror and chaos” and to 
stop the vast majority of Somalis “who long for peace” (1993c, p. 840) from enjoying stability and 
security.  The president’s discussion of the aftermath of Somalia’s civil war portrayed the African nation as 
a place of anarchy.  The famine and death caused by the civil war — the situational chaos — provided a 
primary justification for maintaining an American intervention.   The logic of Clinton’s rhetoric was that the 
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chaos in Somalia had to be managed and curtailed, lest it spread to other places and endanger American 
interests in the Red Sea region.   
 
Clinton’s use of scene was a curious one.   I say so because, typically, presidents highlight the 
specific actions of the agent, not scene, as a line of argument for deploying U.S. forces to a particular area 
of the world.  Only in one other form of military intervention, “rescue missions,” scene has been theorized 
as an important form of topoi.  Procter (1987) argued that presidents who use rescue mission rhetoric do 
not assign blame to the savage agent. Rather, blame is assigned to the scene.  Procter went onto argue 
that the scene infuses the savage agents with qualities of lawlessness, violence, and lack of control.  
Therefore, in “rescue mission” rhetoric, controlling a chaotic scene, not defeating an enemy agent, 
becomes the purpose for military intervention.   
 
Considering that scene is already an important line of argument for presidents in discussing 
“rescue missions,” I suggest that controlling a chaotic scene can also be a rhetorical topos for painting an 
enemy as a primitive savage.  Butler (2002) asserted that the imperial savage is a decentralized enemy, 
either a people or a culture; however, he never emphasized how a rhetor may create such an image.  As I 
noted earlier, presidents traditionally construct enemies through the use of decivilizing vehicles, consisting 
of two kinds of contrastive features, which dehumanize the enemy.  Clinton’s discourse revealed that 
another contrastive feature to add in constructing the enemy “other” was scene. The qualities of the 
chaotic scene of Somalia — famine, death, refugees, homelessness, anarchy — became native attributes 
to the citizens of that nation.  Controlling the chaotic scene, not the defeat of a diabolical foe, became the 
purpose for American intervention.  By intervening, the U.S. could stabilize the situation and bring the 
chaos under control.   
 
Ultimately, Clinton manufactured an image of primitive savagery to depict the Somali 
belligerents.  His discourse also implied that Somalia was a backward, lawless society that was a possible 
threat to America’s symbolic order.  At the same time, his use of imperial savage imagery broadened the 
rhetorical arsenal that presidents use to reconstruct the threat environment in the post-Cold War world.  
Clinton’s use of this imagery expanded our understanding of this discourse frame.  In constructing the 
adversary in Haiti, Clinton turned to the more familiar lines of argument of modern savagery. 
 
Defining the Modern Savage: Haiti 
 
 Clinton inherited an unresolved situation in Haiti from the Bush administration.  In December 
1990, Haiti conducted its first free and fair election in which Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a young Catholic 
priest, became the first democratically elected president of Haiti (Kuypers, 1997).  However, nine months 
later on September 30, 1991, Haiti’s military leaders overthrew Aristide and imposed a military 
dictatorship.  President Bush immediately condemned the coup and issued an executive order declaring a 
trade embargo, but Bush took a cautious position with regard to intervention in the Caribbean nation.  He 
negotiated with Haiti’s military through the Organization of American States (OAS) in hopes that the 
organization could put pressure on the military junta to leave the island and restore Aristide peacefully. 
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Over the next few months, Bush continued his policy of trade sanctions, but also received 
pressure from various interest groups and states to take greater action because of the massive refugee 
exodus from the island.  More than 50,000 people attempted to leave the island nation over the next year 
or so.  When Clinton became president, he largely continued the policies of his predecessor.  Finally, in 
July 1993, Aristide and General Raoul Cédras, the Haitian military junta leader, reached an account, what 
became known as the Governors Island Agreement, where the military promised to step down from power 
by the end of October 1993 and allow Aristide to return to power.  The United States’ part in the 
agreement would be that it would help with a massive aid package to rebuild the country and the 
American military would train a Haitian civilian police force that would provide security for the country.   
 
That plan was put on hold when, on October 11, 1993, the USS Harlan County, carrying American 
and Canadian military trainers, was not allowed to dock in Port-au-Prince.  Armed junta supporters lined 
the docks of Port-au-Prince protesting the American landing.  The American and Canadian military 
personnel were lightly armed and because of the impending danger caused by junta supporters, the 
Harlan County returned to the United States (Hyland, 1999). Clinton blamed the Haitian military for 
“reneging” on the agreement. According to the president, Haiti’s military leaders wanted to “cling to power 
for a little bit longer,” thus, the trainers were not allowed to land in Haiti.  In essence, the Harlan County 
crisis killed the Governors Island Agreement. 
 
 Over the next year, Clinton rhetorically remained committed to restoring Haiti’s democracy.  In 
July 1994, the United States persuaded the UN Security Council to pass a resolution authorizing the use of 
force to compel the return of Aristide (Hyland, 1999). The following month Clinton decided to prepare for 
an invasion of Haiti to restore Aristide to power.  Finally, on September 15, the president used a national 
address to announce his plans for Haiti.  The president declared that the United States had exhausted all 
diplomatic efforts, yet the situation had not been resolved.  Subsequently, Clinton warned Haiti’s military 
leaders that they must leave the country or be prepared for an American invasion. 
 
In justifying American military action in Haiti, Clinton (1994) defined the enemy as the epitome 
of a modern savage.  The president laid the blame squarely on the shoulders of “Haiti’s dictators, led by 
Raoul Cédras” (p. 1558).  These dictators controlled “the most violent regime in our hemisphere” (p. 
1558). They have created a “reign of terror” and must “bear full responsibility” for the death and 
destruction they caused (p. 1558).  Clinton went further to cultivate the modern savage image by 
enumerating the atrocities committed by Cédras and the junta.  The president stated that Cédras’s 
military conducted operations involving “executing children, raping women, killing priests” (p. 1558).  
Moreover, the Haitian dictator’s “reign of terror” involved murdering “innocent civilians,” crushing “political 
freedom,” and plundering “Haiti’s economy” (p. 1558). Those who resisted the junta were “beaten and 
murdered,” and ultimately, the military government “launched a horrible campaign of rape, torture, and 
mutilation.  People starved, children died, thousands of Haitians fled their country, heading to the United 
States across dangerous seas” (p. 1558). 
 
Now Clinton’s depiction of the enemy and the atrocities committed bring several items of note for 
the reader.  First, notice the president’s language was a mixture of both the past and present tense. Using 
both tenses demonstrated a continuum of action taken by the Haitian dictator.  In other words, Cédras 
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and the junta committed and continued to commit acts that were best understood as a “reign of terror.”  
According to Clinton, Cédras “launched” campaigns of terrors where people “starved,” “died,” and had 
“fled” the country.  These atrocities continued into the present with a campaign of “executing,” “raping,” 
and “killing” innocent civilians. The president’s stark and active language gave the impression that 
Cédras’s campaign of terror was ongoing; something that needed to be stopped immediately, lest 
thousands of people be left to suffer.  Clinton’s language invited the audience to see the Haitian threat as 
an imminent crisis that could spread and spill over onto American shores if immediate action was not 
taken.  
 
 Additionally, Clinton’s depiction of the enemy made, in Burkean terms, Cédras a centralized 
pollutant in America’s symbolic universe.  According to Burke (1961) all people organize their lives 
through a symbolic order and a specific hierarchy.  If something occurs that contradicts that order, then it 
becomes polluted and needs to be purified in some way.  Typically, the pollution is removed by assigning 
guilt to a responsible party.  Blame is assigned in two ways: mortification or victimage.  Mortification is an 
assignment of guilt to oneself.  Victimage is assigning guilt to someone else.  This assignment of guilt 
helps to purify the pollution from the order and restore equilibrium. 
 
Similarly, U.S. presidents create a foreign policy universe through their language, with the United 
States being at the top of its hierarchical order.  When an agent commits acts of aggression, especially 
within the U.S. sphere of influence, it violates America’s symbolic order, creating a pollutant that must be 
removed.  According to Clinton, Cédras was to blame for the atrocities within Haiti.  Cédras violated 
America’s symbolic order by ordering atrocities committed in America’s backyard, resulting in the killing of 
innocent civilians, as well as an exodus of thousands of refugees which threatened America’s coastline.  By 
placing the blame for Haiti’s plight upon the shoulders of Cédras, Clinton laid the groundwork to expunge 
the “pollutant” from America’s foreign policy hierarchy.  Through military intervention, the United States 
could fully remove the pollution and restored stability to its symbolic universe.   
 
This centralized, organized, and modern savage became a clear and distinct focal point for the 
U.S. military response.  The president could specifically point to Raoul Cédras as the culprit for Haiti’s 
problems as well as someone who had become a threat to American national security.  By cultivating the 
image of a central enemy figure, the president laid the groundwork for a military intervention where the 
mission was clear.  A clear mission and a clear enemy make the public more apt to support a president’s 
call for military intervention into another state.   
 
Moreover, Clinton’s discourse made it difficult for anyone in the audience to identify positively 
with the Haitian general.  In exploring how George H.W. Bush constructed the image of Saddam Hussein, 
Bates (2004) observed that in order for a person not to see Saddam Hussein as a savage, s/he must 
argue that violations of international law, aggression against a sovereign state, and the murder of children 
are the not the acts of a savage” (p. 454). Correspondingly, Clinton made Cédras synonymous with a 
modern savage.  By delineating the “reign of terror” the Haitian leader had launched against his citizens, 
Clinton’s language stripped him of any civilized identity he might have possessed, making it impossible to 
identify him as anything but a savage.   The implication being that the audience was left with the choice to 
support America’s intervention into Haiti. 
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Fifth, note the difference between Clinton’s enemy construction for Haiti when compared with 
Somalia.  The primary difference between the two interventions was that the president eschewed the use 
of decivilizing vehicles when discussing Somalia.  Instead, he emphasized the chaotic scene within 
Somalia, instead of a particular agent.  The American mission in Somalia was to stabilize, as best it could, 
the chaotic scene, not remove the root troubles within the nation-state.   By contrast, Clinton’s Haiti 
discourse emphasized the culpability of a savage agent. Cédras’s “reign of terror,” according to Clinton, 
was premeditated, and planned.  It was a created chaos.  As a result, the agent, Cédras, became the 
motive force for an American intervention in Haiti, where the mission was to remove the ruling junta, 
restoring stability to the island nation. 
 
Finally, Clinton’s use of modern savage imagery in Haiti continued a long-standing tradition of 
presidents using similar lines of argument.  As Windt (1973) put it, “the lines of argument a President 
chooses come from the office of the presidency and from tradition.”  They “rely on lines of argument that 
other modern presidents have used in similar situations” (pp. 6-7).   President Clinton’s rhetorical 
construction of the threat in Haiti was similar to previous presidents who utilized similar lines of 
arguments to depict modern foes such as the Soviet Union, Manuel Noriega, and Saddam Hussein.  The 




 In this essay, I investigated and analyzed how Bill Clinton crafted the representation of America’s 
foes in a post-Cold War world.  I argued that Clinton utilized two different forms of savagery to depict 
America’s adversaries in Somalia and Haiti.  The president, unlike his Cold War predecessors, did not have 
the luxury of a monolithic enemy around which he could organize his foreign policy discourse.  To deal 
with the post-Cold War threat environment, Clinton expanded the rhetorical options he had to construct 
America’s adversaries.  He reintroduced the use of images of primitive savagery into a president’s 
rhetorical arsenal.  For the president, using both images of savagery assisted in navigating American 
foreign policy through a complex, post-Cold War threat environment.  Overall, this investigation leads me 
to three implications concerning Clinton’s foreign policy discourse.   
 
 First, an analysis of Clinton’s discourse expands our ideas about how we theorize images of 
savagery are cultivated.  As I noted at the outset of this essay, typically, images of savagery were 
cultivated through decivilizing vehicles.  These vehicles are agent-centered.  However, Clinton’s Somalia 
discourse eschewed decivilizing vehicles and instead was scene-centered, which he also utilized in the 
Bosnia intervention (Edwards & Stevenson, 2006). I suggest that when cultivating an image of primitive 
savage presidents emphasize scene as an important line of argument to craft this image. Based on 
Clinton’s discourse we can add this idea as another element in imperial savage topoi. 
 
Second, the president’s use of both images of savagery offers insight into the larger threat 
environment he faced.  In the post-Cold War world, America’s central enemy was not a particular nation-
state, but was global chaos.  As Kathryn Olson (2004) rightly noted, “global chaos in all its various forms, 
as the central foil” (p. 309). Global chaos, as Clinton understood it, was a multi-headed created that 
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shape-shifted from moment to moment.  Part of this hydra was the specter of ethnic violence and rogue 
military states, such as Somalia and Haiti.  In confronting this kind of enemy, the president could not rely 
on a singular rhetorical construct to shape America’s adversaries.  Rather, he needed adaptability and 
flexibility within his discourse to deal with different situations.  Thus, in one sense, Clinton’s discourse was 
“chaotic” because there was no set pattern he could rely upon, as it had been in the Cold War, to deal with 
an ever shape-shifting enemy.  This was understandable if you consider the president’s discourse in the 
larger frame of a threat environment underwritten by chaos.  By employing both images of savagery, the 
president was able to define, navigate, and manage these situations. 
 
Finally, Clinton’s use of both primitive and modern savagery may have left a symbolic legacy for 
future presidents in terms of how they define and manage various threats.  A symbolic legacy is, as Olson 
(2004) put it, “the symbolic frames that it makes available for reproduction” (p. 309).  Surely, future 
American presidents will engage in the use of force and perhaps need the availability of both enemy 
constructs in their rhetorical arsenal.   President George W. Bush’s rhetoric on Iraq resembles Clinton’s 
definition of enemies in similar ways.  For example, at the outset, President Bush defined Saddam Hussein 
as the ultimate modern savage, a centralized agent who could use the coordination of his government 
institutions to cause havoc for the United States and its allies.  However, once Saddam Hussein was 
removed from power, Bush’s depictions of the enemy changed.  Bush continued to lay the blame upon the 
usual suspects such as Al-Qaeda in Iraq, but the president also resorted to defining the Iraqi enemy in 
diffuse terms, as Clinton did in Somalia.  One representative instance can be found in the 2005 White 
House document entitled “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq.”  In that document, the administration 
argued that the “enemy” in Iraq is a group of “rejectionists, Saddamists, and terrorists” (p. 5).  The 
enemy shares an opposition to the elected Iraqi government, but otherwise has “separate and to some 
extent incompatible goals” (p. 5).  As in Somalia, the Bush administration portrays the Iraqi belligerents 
as a diffuse, fragmented, uncoordinated group that causes daily lawlessness. But the fragmented, 
uncoordinated nature of the Iraqi enemy makes it just as “primitive” as the enemy within Somalia.   
Hence, you have Bush depicting America’s enemies in both modern and primitive terms to manage the 
conflict.  Considering that the threats facing the United States are not about to abate anytime soon, one 
may find future presidents constructing enemies in both primitive and modern terms.  Future research will 
have to determine the extent to which these two symbolic frames are used. 
 
As American presidents continue to face a more complex world, including the current “war on 
terror,” there will be situations in which presidents will use symbolic forms of savagery to depict America’s 
enemies.  The use of both forms can certainly be understood as a symptom of change in American foreign 
policy.  This research suggests that those symptoms may continue.  In the future, scholars should work to 
unpack not only Bill Clinton’s foreign policy legacy, but also the methodology with which the United States 
defines nation-states and groups around them.  In doing so, rhetorical scholars can assuredly enable us to 
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